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JURISDICTION-JUVENILE COURT V.
CRIMINAL COURT.- [Illinois]
De-

fendant, a fifteen year old girl, was
found guilty of murder and sentenced to imprisonment by the
criminal court of Cook county.
Prior to the trial, the juvenile court
of Cook county, acting pursuant to
the "Juvenile Court Act" (ILL. STATE
BAR STAT. (1935) c. 23, §319), had
declared the defendant delinquent
on the basis of other misconduct.
Defendant contended that wards of
the juvenile court were not to be
tried without its consent because
Section 9a of the Juvenile Court
Act provides that "The court may
in its discretion in any case of a
delinquent child permit such child
to be proceeded against in accordance with the laws that may be
in force in this state governing the
commission of crimes." On appeal,
affirmed. Held: "The legislature is
without power to confer upon an
inferior court the power to stay a
court created by the constitution
from proceeding with the trial of a
cause jurisdiction of which is expressly granted to it by the constitution." See ILL. CONST., Art. VI,
§26. Moreover, the legislature did
not attempt to confer such power;
Section 9a, like many sections in
the Act, has reference only to cases
pending before the juvenile court
in which the issue of delinquency
.

1;>

is undecided.

It is then that the

juvenile court judge may, in his

discretion, either declare the child
delinquent or transfer the case to
the criminal court. People v. Larrimore, 362 Ill. 206, 199 N. E. 275
(1935).
On the day of the Larrimore decision the court also held in People
v. Lewis, 362 Ill. 229, 199 N. E. 276
(1935), that Section 10 of the Juvenile Court Act providing that "In
any case, the court shall require
notice to be given and investigation
to be made as in other cases under
this act .

. . ."

did not prevent it

from following the Larrimore
decision, since the notice referred
to was clearly notice to be given
by, rather than to, the juvenile
court. The sweeping language of
the Lewis opinion makes clearer
that it is unimportant whether
the child be declared delinquent
before the commission of the crime,
or after the crime but before the
indictment, or after the indictment
but before the trial.
By these decisions the court has
completed its overthrow of the
dictum in People v. Fitzgerald, 322

Ill. 54, 152 N. E. 542 (1926), where,
in affirming the conviction of a boy
for rape, it was stated that if the
boy had been a ward of the juvenile court prosecution would depend
upon its consent. People v. Bruno,
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MANUAL FOR JUVENILE COURT OF346 Ill. 449, 179 N. E. 129 (1931),
had already cast doubt on the FICFS (1932) 35. Nor would such
validity of the Fitzgerald dictum. a holding, as the court believes,
Bruno, a ward at the time of his render meaningless the last part of
conviction by the criminal court, Section 9a. That part would simply
sought thereafter to raise this juris- not be permitted to limit the predictional point by a writ of coram ceding, nor the spirit of the secnobis. It was held by the court tion. However, the last part of
that the writ furnished no relief Section 9a does make the contrary
from the consequences of a neg- reasoning of the court very tenable,
ligent defense. The difficulty in- if not inevitable-particularly in
herent in the position taken by the view of the rule that, if possible,
court is that the question of neg- an ambiguous statute should be
ligence should be irrelevant in de- construed as constitutional.
termining whether the criminal
The proposition that a constitucourt has jurisdiction over the sub- tional court may not be stayed from
ject matter. See Note (1932) 20 proceeding with the trial of a cause
Ill. L. Rev. 901 (able discussion of over which it has been given juristhese cases and correct prophecy of diction by the constitution is sound;
the result of the instant case by whether the interfering court be
Mr. Riley).
inferior or also constitutional is imFor at least two reasons little material. People v. Warren, 260
fault should be found with the in- Ill. 297, 103 N. E. 248 (1913) (overterpretation placed upon Section ruled by People v. Feinberg, 348
9a by the court, though it destroys II. 549, 181 N. E. 437 (1932) only
the effectiveness of the section. insofar as it follows Berkowitz v.
The section is ambiguous, and Lester, 121 Ill. 99, 11 N. E. 860
(1887)). The court in the Lewis
furthermore the constitution precludes an opposite holding irre- opinion stated that the facts did
not make it necessary to decide
spective of how Section 9a be conIt seems unlikely, how- what the result would be if the
strued.
ever, that the drafters of this charge against the defendant pendamendment were aware they were ing in the juvenile court was the
not conferring exclusive jurisdic- same as the charge against him in
tion over delinquent children upon the criminal court. By the reasonthe juvenile court. Note that other ing of the instant decisions it would
amendments to Section 9, passed seem, however, that if the criminal
at the same time as Section 9a, court had obtained jurisdiction
deal with the care of children after over the person in such a case,
a declaration of delinquency. Cer- nothing could bar a prosecution.
tainly Julian W. Mack, early ju- The possibility that perhaps the
venile court judge, implies that the juvenile court had retained juriscourt was given exclusive jurisdic- diction over the defendants in the
tion, and, when the purpose of ju- instant cases until they reached
venile court legislation is taken into twenty-one was not discussed by
account, such an interpretation the court. See Hamerick v. People,
Elseseems plausible. See Mack, The 126 Ill. App. 491 (1906).
Juvenile Court (1909) 23 Harv. L. where it has been properly held
Rev. 104 at 109; RILEY, A WORKING that where juvenile court legisla-
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tion continues the jurisdiction after

a declaration of delinquency, it
was not contemplated that this
should prevent criminal prosecution. If such were contemplated,

the section would be unconstitutional as an unreasonable and arbitrary criminal provision. State v.

lature, it would be invalid when
invoked to support a "lack of jurisdiction" defense to prosecution in
a criminal court of Illinois. On
this problem generally, see 1
WHARTON, CRIINIAL LAW (12th ed.

Pence, 303 Mo. 598, 262 S. W. 360

375; MILLER,
c. 1, §lr, c.
8, §34c; ELLIOTT, CONFLICTING PENAL

(1924); cf. §1 of the Juvenile Court

THEORIES IN STATUTORY CRIMINAL

Act. The court in the instant cases
could have eliminated the constitutional obstacle to an opposite
holding only by the strained construction that the jurisdiction given

LAW (1931) cc. 3, 4, 5; Flexner and
Oppenheimer, The Legal Aspect of
the Juvenile Court (1923) 57 Am.

the criminal court was impliedly
limited by the inherent right of the
state to act as parens patriae.

1932)

§§369,

371,

CRIMINAL LAW (1934)

L. Rev. 65 at 75, 79; (1935) 20 St.
Louis L. Rev. 282; (1929) 14 St.
Louis L. Rev. 429. However, it is
interesting to note that the majority of state constitutions, unlike

That the Juvenile Court Act did
not repeal by implication the sec-

Illinois, vest the judicial power in
a supreme court, circuit courts, and
tions of the criminal code providing such other courts as the legislature
that children above ten years are may establish. If such a constitucapable of crime (ILL. STATE BAR tion also leaves the apportionment
STATS. (1935) c. 38, §§619, 620) is
of jurisdiction to the legislature,
clear since the Act is not criminal the constitutional question of the
legislation, and also because to be instant case could not arise. At
ieasonable the Act must repeal best there would be merely a statucriminal jurisdiction whether or tory conflict between the criminal
not the child be a ward of the ju- code and the juvenile court act.
venile court. Nothing in the Act It is reasonable to suppose that
supports the latter position, and it the problem is not so apt to deis contrary to the holding in Peo- velop where the court having crimple v. Fitzgerald, supra. See also inal jurisdiction over the child also
People v. Fisher, 303 Ill. 430, 135 has juvenile court powers.
N. E. 751 (1922).
There will naturally be disagreeTypical provisions in the ju- ment as to the effect and policy of
venile court acts of other states the instant decisions. It must be
stipulate that the juvenile court remembered that. juvenile court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction in legislation has been sustained on
all cases; or that the jurisdiction the ground that it is legislation enshall be exclusive in the discretion acted by the state as parenspatriae.
of the juvenile judge; or that the See People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453,

child shall be prosecuted for serious crimes only; or that the child

114 N. E. 145 (1916); Lindsay v.
Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N. E. 892

shall be prosecuted only after a
finding by the juvenile judge of
hopeless incorrigibility. It is apparent that if this type provision
were passed by the Illinois legis-

(1913); HURLEY, ORIGIN OF THE
ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW
(1907); FLEXNER AND BALDWIN,
JUVENILE

COURTS

AND

PROBATION

(1914) pt. 1. As it is not criminal
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legislation (Witter v. County Commissioners of Cook County, 256 Ill.
616, 100 N. E. 148 (1912)), the constitution does not require that the
right of trial by jury be preserved
in delinquency cases. See §2 of the
Juvenile Court Act. Cf. (1933) 22
Ill. Bar J. 117; (1933) 10 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rev. 398. It follows also
that the juvenile court, a part of
the circuit court of Cook County
(Lindsay v. Lindsay, supra), does
not contravene the rule of People
v. Feinberg, supra, that the criminal courts of Cook County has exclusive, rather than concurrent
criminal jurisdiction with the circuit court.
To many the instant decisions
will seem a backward step, a frustration of the purpose behind juvenile court legislation of insuring
a humane and understanding handling of each delinquent by a special court.
See Lou, JUvENmE
COURTS IN THE U. S. (1927) 42;

451
that children under twenty-one are
incapable of crime would give the
juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction. See (1920) 91 Cent. L. J. 78,
and Miller v. Brown, 31 Utah 473,
88 Pac. 609 (1907). An amendment stating that children under
twenty-one were prima facie incapable of crime, but that the juvenile judge could find them capable and transfer them to the criminal court would likely be held
unconstitutional as an attempt to
restrict the jurisdiction of the criminal court.
JACK L. O'DoNNELL.

EMBEZZLEMENT -

RETAIR

]PROSECUTION OF

FOR FAILURE

TO

TURN

Defendant was licensed as a dealer in
OvER GAS TAx.--[Wisconsin]

motor fuel oil. He was charged
and convicted of embezzlement of
moneys belonging to the state, collected by him from purchasers
paying the motor fuel tax imposed
STANDARD JUVENILE COURT LAW at
232, §§5, 11, 12. Note also that by statute. The statute provided
Congress in 1932 provided that that any dealer who fails to pay the
children accused of federal crimes tax should be guilty of a misdeshould be transferred to state ju- meanor punishable only by fine.
Defendant contended that a debtorvenile courts. 47 STAT. 301 (1933),
18 U. S. C. A. §662a (1935); Wah- creditor relationship existed, and
renbrock, State Juvenile Court that the sole penalty was that proProcedure for Federal Juvenile vided by the statute. On appeal,
Offenders (1931) 30 Mich. L. Rev. affirmed. Held: The relationship
113. See also Ex parte Januszewski. between the defendant and the
196 Fed. 123 (1911). Such thought, state was that of principal and
however, probably overlooks the agent, and he was thus properly
fact that the administrators of the convicted of embezzlement. Ancriminal law will seldom desire to derson v. State, 265 N. W. 210
(Wis. 1936).
obstruct the valuable work of the
juvenile court, as well as the imThis case followed the almost
portance to the welfare of society identical case of a conviction of
of retaining the moral law, and embezzlement for failure to turn
threat of punishment. See Note over the gas tax in Illinois. Peo(1926) 21 Ill. L. Rev. 375. An ple v. Kopman, 358 Ill. 479, 193 N.
amendment to the criminal code E. 516 (1934). Both courts reacreating a conclusive presumption soned that the statute imposed an
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agency relationship upon the retailer, making him a fiduciary to
collect the tax and to turn it over
to the state. The Wisconsin statute
explicitly provides that the tax
collected shall be held in trust in
a separate fund for the sole use of
the state. As an abstract proposition of law, then, the relationship
might be such as to warrant a conviction for embezzlement.
But there can be no doubt that
the two courts have stretched the
basic concept of embezzlement.
That crime has always required the
breach of a trust or fiduciary relationship on the part of the agent.
Raine v. State, 143 Tenn. 168, 226
S. W. 189 (1920); State v. Berdell,
87 Tex. Cr. Rep. 310, 220 S. W. 1101
(1920). The existence of a fiduciary relationship is essential. People v. Heinzeman, 351 II. 402, 184
N. E. 600 (1933). It seems obvious
that the relative trust and confidence of each retailer is not considered either by the state or by
the purchaser. If courts will sustain a conviction for embezzlement
in such a situation as this, the road
is left open for their legislature, by
the use of a few words, to make
every retailer an agent of the state
to collect the "sales" tax, thus subjecting him to the possibility of
being indicted for embezzlement if
he does not turn the money in
promptly. A much more common
sense view of this matter would
be to regard the relationship as one
of debtor-creditor, and not to put
retailers in a category different
from that of any other taxpayer.
ANDREW BUNTA.

CONTEMPT-PERJURY PUNISHABLE

AS CONTEMPT.-[Illinois] Respondent having testified in a criminal

proceeding, was ordered by the
trial judge to appear and answer
questions concerning the truth of
certain of his statements. Upon
inquiry, respondent admitted that
he had testified falsely, whereupon
the court committed him for contempt. On appeal, reversed. Held:
No additional testimony in a subsequent proceeding is permitted to
prove the falsity of the statements
questioned. People v. La Scola,
282 Il. App. 328 (1935).
Although to testify falsely often
constitutes perjury (see ILL. STATE
BAR STATS. (1935) c. 38, §482), it
likewise has been declared to be
"undoubtedly a great contempt of
court." Stockham v. French, 130
Eng. Rep. 147 (1823); Ex parte
Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378 (1919);
United States v. Dachis, 36 F. (2d)
601 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); Berkson v.
People, 154 Ill. 81, 39 N. E. 1079
(1894). Indeed, one court found
it "difficult to see why the penalty
for each offense should not be imposed." In re Steiner, 195 Fed.
299, 302 (S. D. N. Y. 1912). False
swearing has been made punishable as contempt by statute in at
least one jurisdiction (see People
v. Fourquet, 17 Porto Rico 1037
(1911)), and in bankruptcy proceedings it is punishable under §41
of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT.
556 (1890), 11 U. S. C. A. §69
(1927); see (1921) 11 A. L. R. 344
and cases cited.
In the ordinary case, however,
because the power may be exercised summarily, certain limitations have been placed upon its use
as a means of punishing perjury.
United States v. McGovern, 60 F.
(2d) 880 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); People v. Paynter, 250 Ill. App. 235
(1930); People v.* Berrell, 216 Ill.
App. 341 (1920). In the first place,

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
since the power to punish for contempt is a defensive weapon of the
court to protect its dignity and the
administration of justice, it is an
almost universal requirement that
the false testimony be obstructive
(Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1
(1933) noted in (1933) 28 Ill. L.
Rev. 292, (1933) 24 J. Crim. L. 446,
(1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 850; People v. Freeman, 256 Ill. App. 423
(1928)), this element being required in addition to those necessary to support a charge of perjury.
Ex parte Hudgings, supra; Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass.
25, 172 N. E. 209 (1930); but see In
re Bronstein, 182 Fed. 349 (S. D.
N. Y. 1910); In re Fellerman, 149
Fed. 244 (S. D. N. Y. 1906). Of
greater importance, however, is
the requirement that the falsity be
evident to the court from its judicial knowledge. People v. Richman,
222 Ill. App. 147 (1921); People v.
Stone, 181 Ill. App. 475 (1913);
Riley v. Wallace, 188 Ky. 470, 22
S. W. 1085, 11 A. L. R. 342 (1920);
Hegelaw v. State, 24 Ohio 103, 155
N. E. 620 (1927); see Comment
(1933) 21 Calif. L. Rev. 582, 585.
If the testimony is obviously untrue, the court may proceed summarily (United States v. Appel, 211
Fed. 495 (S. D. N. Y. (1913);
Berkson v. People, supra); but if
its falsity is controverted or rests
upon a mere conclusion of the
judge the remedy is prosecution
for perjury-not commitment for
contempt. People v. Anderson, 272
Ill. App. 93 (1933). Judicial knowledge of the falsity may be acquired
by the court from conflicting affidavits, or by admissions made by
the witness. People v. Freeman,
supra; People v. Hadesman, 223 Ill.
App. 219 (1921); People v. Gard,
259 Ill. 238 (1913); The Dunnegan

Sisters, 53 F. (2d) 502 (S. D. N. Y.
1932); Young v. State, 198 Ind. 629,
154 N. E. 478 (1926). Indeed, one
court in Illinois has required that
the untruth must have been disclosed by the witness himself and
not by the testimony of other witnesses. People v. Hille, 192 Ill.
App. 139 (1915). Accord: Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass.
25, 172 N. E. 209 (1930); State v.
Meese, 200 Wis. 454, 229 N. W. 31
(1930). The instant case.adds still
a further requirement: The untruth must be disclosed on crossexamination and not upon a subsequent inquiry instituted by a
suspicious judge.
The insistence of the courts on
prosecutions for perjury, with the
attendant safeguard of jury trial
in all but exceptional cases, is to
be commended; but where an untruth of an obstructive nature has
been admitted by the witness himself, there seems to be little reason
to insist upon prosecution for perjury, convictions for which are
notoriously hard to obtain. Indeed, as one writer has stated, even
the requirement that the statement
be judicially known to be false "is
not in harmony with the established power of the courts to deal
with other contempts such as
newspaper libels on the court."
See Comment (1933) 21 Calif. L.
Rev. 582, 584. The fear that the
threat of summary punishment for
contempt might be used as an inquisitorial weapon to secure a desired answer seems almost unfounded.
Wn LAm HYNas.

199 YEAR SENTENCE-VALIDITy iN
LA.-[illinois]
Defendant was convicted of murLIGHT oF PA oLx
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der and sentenced to a term of 199
years in prison. Under the Illinois
statute (ILL. STATE BAR STATS.
(1935) c. 38, §801) a prisoner under a determinate sentence is not
eligible for parole until he has
served at least one-third of his
term. Contending that so long a
sentence was an attempt to circumvent the parole act, since it deprived him of any possible chance
of parole, defendant appealed. Affirmed. Held: The parole law does
not prevent a sentence of 199 years,
for that act is one of clemency, and
relates only to prison government
and discipline. People v. Pace, 362
II. 224, 198 N. E. 319 (1935).
It may well be that the legislature did not consider the possibility that so long a sentence might
be imposed, or that any criminal
might, by this device, seemingly be
deprived of all opportunity for
parole. But the wording of the
applicable statutes is so clear that
there seems to be no room for interpretation, at least so far as the
validity of the original sentence is
concerned. Cf. Hickam v. People,
137 Ill. 75, 27 N. E. 88 (1891) (99
year sentence upheld). It is generally held improper for the prosecuting attorney to refer to the
parole laws in argument to the jury
for a drastic penalty, though taken
by itself such argument may not
be sufficient cause for reversal.
Farrellv. People, 133 Ill. 244, 24 N.
E. 423 (1890); People v. Murphy,
276 Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 609 (1916).
But since the mental processes of
juries are generally not open to
examination to impeach their result, the inference that the jury,
without official prompting, probably did intend to circumvent the
parole law is not material. See 5

(2d ed. 1923)
§§2348-49.
Short of executive clemency, the
defendant's only hope must be the
rather strained construction of the
parole section that since persons
serving life sentences are eligible
for parole in twenty years the
legislature intended that no prisoner otherwise a suitable subject
for parole should be confined for a
longer period. Such a contention,
even if accepted, should not affect
the validity of the original sentence
and could not properly be passed
upon by the court in the instant*
case.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

DONALD J. BELL.

HORSE RACING-PRosECUTION UNDER GENERAL OR SPECIAL GAlING
S T AT U TE -

EJUSDEm

GENERIS.-

[Texas] Defendant was tried and
convicted of keeping a place for
betting on horse races. The indictment was framed under Article 625
of the Texas Penal Code which
states that any person who "shall
keep . . . any . . . place . . .
to bet or wager, or to gamble with
or
cards, dice or dominoes, . ..
as a place where people resort to
gamble, bet or wager upon anything whatever," shall be guilty of
a felony. A few years subsequent
to the passage of the Article the
legislature passed Article 649 providing for punishment as a misdemeanor any "owner, agent or lessee
of any property" who permits the
same to be used as a place for betting on horse races. The evidence
showed that defendant kept a place
for betting on horse races but did
not show that he was an owner,
agent or lessee. Defendant contended he should be punished for a
misdemeanor and not for a felony.
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On appeal, reversed. Held: The
second statute controls, being special and embracing the same or
similar subject matter. Thomas v.
State, 91 S. W. (2d) 716 (Tex. Cr.
Rep. 1936).
The court stated that since the
first statute was general and the
latter pertained only to horse racing, it would supersede the first,
and substantiated its position by
saying that betting on horse racing
was not ejusdem generis with betting on cards, dice or dominoes.
Doubtless horse racing is not
ejusdem generis with cards, dice
or dominoes, but that argument
does not seem pertinent here. The
rule of ejusdem generis-that when
general words follow a series of
specific words, they must be held
to be qualified by and similar in
nature to the preceding specific
words-is merely a rule of construction to be applied when the
language itself is ambiguous. United
States v. Bitty, 208 U. S. 393, 402
(1907). See also State v. Grosvenor, 149 Tenn. 158, 258 S. W. 140
(1924), and other cases cited by
the dissent at 721. But the rule
should not be arbitrarily applied
where the section as a whole and
the popular feeling then prevailing
show the purpose of the legislation.
United States Cement Co. v.
Cooper, 172 Ind. 599, 88 N. E. 69
(1909).
The statute here seems unambiguous when it condemns keeping
a place "to gamble, bet or wager
upon anything whatever." Surely
it would require no stretch of the
imagination to include betting on
horse races within these words. In
Gillock v. People, 171 Ill. 307, 49
N. E. 712 (1898), the Illinois court
sustained a conviction of burglary
of a henhouse under a statute enumerating a dwelling house, kitchen,
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office, shop, storehouse, or any
other building. See also Commonwealth v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 124
Ky. 497, 99 S. W. 596 (1907); State
v. Eckhart, 332 Mo. 49, 133 S. W.
321 (1910).
The dissent makes the startling
statement that this defendant
would be guilty of no crime, saying
that he could not be prosecuted
under the special statute. That
Article applies only to an "owner,
agent or lessee" of property used
for gambling on races. The evidence in this case showed that defendant was not an owner, agent
or lessee, but was only "keeping"
the premises and thus could not be
guilty under that law. If this be
true, then the majority overlooked
a serious defect in the special statute, for in many cases it would be
next to impossible to prove that
one who only kept a gambling place
was an owner, agent or lessee.
A reasonable correlation of the
two articles would be that the legislature had left it to the discretion of the prosecutor to determine
under which statute the accused
should be prosecuted. Choices of
statutes for framing indictments
are not uncommon. But under the
reasoning of the majority opinion
the prosecutor is forced to rely
upon the special statute (assuming
that he can prove accused was an
owner, agent or lessee). But since,
as stated by the dissent, "the vice
of gambling is so ruinous and the
denunciations of same so plain in
all our common law and statutory
utterances," a more practical solution might be fo allow prosecution
under the general statute with its
more severe penalties when warranted by the facts of the particular case.
RUSSELL BUNDESEN.

